Weimar’s Marxist Heretic

Karl Korsch stood out as one of the most original revolutionary Marxists of Weimar’s leftist intelligentsia; he was Weimar’s Marxist heretic. The Weimar scene was rich and teeming with intellectual creativity “a dance on the edge of a volcano” Peter Gay wrote in his history of the Weimar years.¹Gay, Peter (1968): Weimar Culture, the Outsider as Insider. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Preface. The leftist intelligentsia grouped together a diverse motley of scientists associated with Einstein’s breakthroughs, philosophers trying to figure out where they stood in relation to Hegel, Marx and modern logic, playwrights like Brecht producing a critique of capitalism through the alienation-effect, novelists like Alfred Döblin capturing the tense experience of Weimar Berlin, educational reformers experimenting with novel ways of learning, socialists and anarchists debating exactly how to take the workers’ movement forward, and so many strategies challenging Stalinism and attempting to avert the looming dangers of fascism.

Before turning to Korsch’s classic text Marxism and Philosophy, first a brief biographical outline. Korsch himself was born in Tostedt (1886), studied law and philosophy, joined in Jena’s democratic student movement, the London Fabian Society and the German Social Democratic Party’s right-wing before the outbreak of the First World War. He radicalised leftwards under the impact of the brutality of the front, participated in the workers’ and soldiers’ councils in the early phase of the German Revolution of 1918, wrote extensively on socialisation, and joined the Independent Socialist Party of Germany. In that formation he partook in the counter-mobilisations against the Kapp Putsch, defended the merger with the German Communist Party, took up a ministerial post in the Thuringian government at the time of the failed October uprising and subsequently became the earliest and most consistent of anti-Stalinists on the German left. He was far more than a philosopher – he was a philosophical-political agent of the highest order. Hitler’s ascension to power forced Korsch to flee Germany. After staying briefly in England, Denmark, Sweden and France, he finally made his way to the United States where he spent his last years before his death in Belmont, Massachusetts (1961).

Marxism and Philosophy

Though Marxism and Philosophy was an early, first, and in no way the last word about Marxism and philosophy, it remains a classic worth reading today. At the time of its publication in 1923, Marxism and Philosophy was a significant innovation in that it understood Marxism itself not as a relativistic-historicism, nor a value-less scientific theory unrelated to the revolutionary class struggles, nor an economically reductionist explanation of history, but as a scientific theory of social revolution. It is a gripping short essay, its length masking the deceptive sophistication of its content. Korsch intervened into his historical conjuncture with the demand that revolutionary Marxism articulate at the theoretical, philosophical and scientific level the pathbreaking content of Marx’s “scientific socialism”. The essay showed why Marxists ought to take philosophical questions seriously; it was part of Korsch’s attempt to resolve the theoretical slips in Marxism’s relation to philosophy after the crisis of the Second International (when they voted for the war credits) and the Russian Revolution. Many Marxists of the Second International, though not all, had been a bit too slapdash in their approach to philosophy, impoverishing their own Marxism with admixtures of bourgeois theories. Marxism and Philosophy is a fine attempt to systematically grasp the revolution in philosophy inaugurated by Marx’s critique of political economy, which Korsch thought was a decisive scientific breakthrough that needed to better guide Marxist political formations.

Marxism and Philosophy attempted answers to some decisive questions: why had most Marxists of the Second International failed to correctly appreciate the relationship between Marxism and philosophy? What implications did this lapse have for their practice? What were the limits of bourgeois philosophy? What antagonistic yet productive role did a bourgeois philosopher like Hegel have in the constitution of Marx’s materialist dialectic? What was the nature of Marx’s new materialism? What was the relation between philosophy, revolution and the state? What was the relation between Marx’s early philosophy and his later scientific critique of political economy? What was the role of ideology in social revolution? In what sense is the revolutionary materialist dialectic a philosophy of the working class? What did Marx mean when he wrote that philosophers had only interpreted the world, but the point was to change it?

With this set of questions, Korsch gave voice to core themes that would feature in later debates over Marxism and philosophy throughout the twentieth century and beyond. Even if future answers would shift and differ from Korsch’s own, he set a topography of questions and described a terrain that so many are still attempting to traverse. In that sense, Korsch renewed theoretical reflection within Marxism itself, and this alone was a great merit.

Though space doesn’t allow for a detailed account of each of Korsch’s answers to the questions, I would like to stress Korsch’s analogy of the relation between Marxism and the state on one hand, and Marxism’s relation to philosophy on the other. The parallel between these relations is decisive because it showcases a shared criticism of a mode of philosophical practice that submits to bourgeois domination. Actually, and Korsch is quite explicit about it, Marxism and Philosophy could be read as an intervention doing for philosophy what Lenin’s State and Revolution did for politics and the state. He wrote:

From 1845 onwards, at the latest, Marx and Engels characterised their new materialist and scientific standpoint as no longer philosophical. It should be remembered here that all philosophy was for them equivalent to bourgeois philosophy. But it is precisely the significance of this equation of all philosophy with bourgeois philosophy that needs to be stressed. For it involves much the same relationship as that of Marxism and the State. Marx and Engels not only combated one specific historical form of the State, but historically and materialistically they equated the State as such with the bourgeois State and they therefore declared the abolition of the State to be the political aim of communism. Similarly, they were not just combating specific philosophical systems – they wanted eventually to overcome and supersede philosophy altogether, by scientific socialism.²Korsch, Karl (2012) Marxism and Philosophy. London: Verso, p. 77.

Thus, for Korsch, the political aim of communism was simultaneously the abolition and transcendence of the constrained forms of both philosophical-scientific work and political organisation in modern states that characterised bourgeois social relations and the reproduction of their modes of domination.

Anti-dogmatic Marxism, consciousness and the materialist dialectic

Korsch made three theoretical moves that still retain their validity today. First of all, Korsch applied the materialist conception of history to the history of Marxism itself. This allowed him to adopt a critical view of the efforts by Marxists of the Second and Third Internationals. This was an anti-dogmatic conception of Marxism because it insisted that we tie the theoretical, methodological and systematic forms of thought to historically specific situations and conjunctures of class struggle. To be anti-dogmatic, in Korsch’s sense, is to apply a critical, dialectical and historical conception of Marxism to its own history. That is to say, he insisted on a materialist reading of Marxism, its theories and the political struggles waged in its name.

The consequences of Korsch’s anti-dogmatic commitment to a strictly materialist reading of Marxism have yet to be fully worked out. And this is in part because the historical conjunctures of class struggle are themselves constantly developing. Korsch then provides the intellectual resources to be anti-dogmatic, but consistently Marxist.

Second, Korsch followed Marx in holding that the materialist dialectic was characterised by a “coincidence of consciousness and reality.”³Korsch, Karl (2012) Marxism and Philosophy. London: Verso, p. 134. This conjunction of consciousness and reality was necessary if Marx’s critique of political economy could also, at the same time, motivate socialism itself. The value of this idea can be highlighted if we take rival conceptions. For instance, for Bhaskar Sunkara, “whatever the precise model of socialism after capitalism is, it should be simple and require no massive changes in human consciousness”.⁴Sunkara issue 235; 2020. Here socialism is held distinct from human consciousness, and is imagined as a set of social changes made possible independent of similar changes in our consciousness.

Korsch has something more subversive and truthful to say. Sunkara’s argument is an example of what Korsch would call a primitive and pre-dialectical statement sacrificing the dialectical coincidence of consciousness and reality, giving a motionless notion of the class struggle. To say that no massive changes in human consciousness are necessary while simultaneously asking for a socialism is an evasion of Marx’s materialism and a disavowal of social revolution. For Korsch, it is no exaggeration to say, without a commitment to the co-determination of consciousness and reality, no successful workers’ revolution is possible, and no mass revolutionary historical transformations are possible. This is because socialism requires the genuine democratic participation of the plural mass of workers over the decision-making, wealth and resources of the world. Such democratic participation would itself rest on and in turn produce radical changes in consciousness. Sunkara’s vision is at best technocratic, offering a top-down transformation of social relations, and at worst a complete disavowal of the revolutionary movement itself.

Third, with Marx’s afterword to the second (1873) German edition of Capital in mind, Korsch distinguished between an idealist-mystified dialectic that conformed to the existing state of things and a materialist-rational, critical and revolutionary, dialectic that, in Marx’s words, “includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up”.⁵Marx, Karl MECW:35, Capital, p. 20.  The meaning of the negation of an existing state of things – whether they be political regimes or economic relations – invoked in Marx’s quote could be drawn from Goethe’s Faust, when he wrote that a spirit of negation sees to it that “all that comes to be deserves to perish”.⁶Goethe Faust, Part One. No single outcome of human thought, action, truth, nor even historical systems is absolute; they are all instead subject to transience and transformation.