Fascism, Trump, and Trumpism
A Critique of Gordon and Webber's Analysis of Trumpism
March 6, 2026
This essay is part of an ongoing discussion concerning the relationship between Trumpism and fascism within the pages of this journal. For earlier entries in this discussion, see Todd Gordon and Jefferey R. Webber’s “The Authoritarian Disposition: Capitalism, Liberalism, Fascism,” DK Renton’s “Trump, Fascism, and the Authoritarian Turn,” and Gordon and Webber’s “Water on the Brain: Trump 2.0 and the Crisis of Liberal Rule.”
We hope to have a response from Gordon and Webber in the coming months.
Donald Trump’s election in 2016 generated extensive analysis within the left about “Trumpism,” its essence and agenda. Reflecting on his first term, his dramatic exit, and one year of Trump 2.0 should offer substantial insights for developing a more nuanced understanding of Trump and his regime. Yet, we still find ourselves grappling with whether Trumpism signifies a fascist or neofascist force, or if it constitutes a different form of authoritarianism altogether.
This critical review examines two articles by Todd Gordon and Jeffrey Webber, published in Spectre. The first article, “The Authoritarian Disposition: Capitalism, Liberalism, Fascism” appeared in the fall of 2023, while the second, “Water on the Brain, Trump 2.0 and the Crisis of Liberal Rule“ was posted in June 2025.1Todd Gordon and Jeffery R. Webber, “The Authoritarian Disposition: Capitalism, Liberalism, and Fascism,” Spectre 8 (Nov 2023): http://doi.org/10.63478/RPBJ9W3D; Todd Gordon and Jeffery R. Webber, “Water on the Brain: Trump 2.0 and the Crisis of Liberal Rule,” Spectre, June 24, 2025, http://doi.org/10.63478/XT55M7G4. Additionally, the authors gave a summary of the articles in a talk at the HM Conference in Montreal in May 2025.
The primary reason for focusing on these articles is that they clearly outline the theoretical foundations and positions of various Trotskyist tendencies in the ongoing debate. Moreover, the arguments and conclusions presented in these articles, to some extent, shape the views of others on the left, even among those who may not necessarily identify with that tradition. This influence may stem from the betrayal and tragic consequences of the Stalinist strategies and tactics that dominated the struggle against fascism during the interwar period. Trotsky, despite some of his own misreadings, was ultimately correct about how the Nazis could have been stopped in Germany. However, the following is not so much a critique of Trotsky’s position as it is an examination of the mechanical application of his views to the rise of fascism today.
The authors present a framework outlining seven elements of fascism, which, with a few caveats, draws heavily upon the “six elements” of Trotsky’s theory outlined in Ernest Mandel’s introduction to The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany.2Ernest Mandel, introduction to the The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, by Leon Trotsky (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971), available at https://iire.org/node/1004. According to this schema, the rise of fascism requires “a severe and sustained crisis of capitalism,” a sense of “civilizational degeneration,” “the crisis of bourgeois democracy,” “the inadequacy of traditional military dictatorship,” and “the petty bourgeois composition of fascism’s mass base.”3Gordon and Webber, “The Authoritarian Disposition.” Since the existence of these elements cannot be denied, the authors emphasize two additional elements to distinguish their theory: a broken state equilibrium and the extralegal street violence of fascist paramilitaries. Using these points, they argue that the Trump regime does not meet the threshold for fascism.
As I will point out, their conclusion stems from a flawed perspective that overlooks the underlying factors that characterize both today’s neofascism and its contributing elements in the context of the contemporary United States. Their account of the broken state equilibrium does not accurately describe its role in the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany. Additionally, the discussion of paramilitaries and their street violence effectively reduces fascism to those factors and again ignores its contextualization within Trumpism.
A key emphasis among those in the Trotskyist tradition is that fascism emerges as a reaction to the perceived threat posed by the working class movement to protect the capitalist system. However, in the current context, where such a movement is largely absent, the argument about a fascist takeover of power is considered to lose its relevance. Consequently, Gordon and Webber’s reliance on Trotsky’s analysis leads them to presume the absence of fascism and supply the category of “competitive authoritarianism” to describe Trumpism and other contemporary forms of reactionary authoritarianism. In the following three sections, I will argue against Gordon and Webber’s application of Trotsky’s model to the contemporary context, compare their competing label of “competitive authoritarianism” to describe what I view to be the fascist elements of that context, and contextualize Trumpism within the contemporary international neofascist response to the crises of global capitalism. As I contend, Gordon and Webber’s overly stringent adoption of Trotsky’s criteria leads them to misrepresent neofascist elements of the Trumpist project and to underemphasize the importance of antifascist tactics.
Trotsky’s Analysis, Then and Today
The crux of Gordon and Webber’s rejection of the fascist label as a description of Trumpism rests on the current absence of a credible leftwing threat to the capitalist order today. This shapes Gordon and Webber’s analysis in two ways: 1) it leads them to uncritically accept both Trotsky’s thesis regarding the inability of the traditional means of the bourgeois state to maintain a state of equilibrium in the interwar German context and the applicability of that thesis to the contemporary United States, and 2) it leads them to underestimate the relative strength and importance of the rightwing paramilitary groups supporting Trump.
To begin with the first problem, Trotsky argued that the inability of the bourgeois state to maintain the equilibrium between class forces led to the adoption of extralegal and extraparliamentary tactics—that is, to fascism. Trotsky put it this way in 1932: at the moment that the “normal” police and military resources of the bourgeois dictatorship, together with their parliamentary screens, no longer suffice to hold society in a state of equilibrium, the turn of the fascist regime arrives.4Leon Trotsky, What Next?: Vital Questions for the German Proletariat (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1932), emphasis added, available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/1932-ger/index.htm. But Nicola Poulantzas rejected both Trotsky’s assessment of the relative strength of the left and his focus on the left rather than the bourgeois elements leading to fascism. To quote Poutlantzas:
Neither in Germany nor in Italy did the triumph of fascism correspond to a political crisis of equilibrium in any sense of the term. The working class had already been thoroughly defeated by the time fascism came into power, and the bourgeoisie did not have to pay for this defeat with any catastrophic equilibrium. In other words, throughout the rise of fascism, the bourgeoisie remained the principal aspect of the principal contradiction.5Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism (London: Verso, 2018), 61, emphases added.
Rejecting Poulantzas’s quoted assertion, Gordon and Webber write with respect to their sixth element of fascism that:
[before] fascists are able to take power, with support from the bourgeoisie, they must first alter the balance of forces in their favor by inflicting partial setbacks on movements of the exploited and oppressed. We can call this the weakening, short of defeat, of the revolutionary threat from below. Contrary to Nicos Poulantzas’s claim, classical fascist success was premised on such a weakening, but not defeat, of the workers’ movement.6Gordon and Webber, “The Authoritarian Disposition,” emphases added.
The distinction Gordon and Webber draw between the “defeat” and the “weakening” of the worker’s movement fails to address two questions. First, even if we accept the argument that the revolutionary threat was not entirely defeated but only diminished, was it still the crisis of equilibrium that led to the Nazis’ takeover of power in Germany? Second, even if we were to accept the claim that the victory of fascism in Germany stemmed from the bourgeoisie’s reaction to the so-called “crisis of equilibrium,” does that entail that it constitutes a universal premise for fascist takeovers across historical contexts?
…even if Trotsky’s claim that the rise of German fascism stemmed from the bourgeoisie’s reaction to the so called “crisis of equilibrium” was correct, it does not mean that the German context constitutes a universal premise for fascist takeovers in post interwar capitalism. Today, no country faces an immediate threat of working class revolution, and there is little indication that such a threat will emerge in the near future. From [Gordon and Webber's] perspective, therefore, any argument that labels the Trump administration as fascist must be flawed…
To begin with the first question, regardless of whether the revolutionary threat was defeated or merely weakened, the Nazis—backed by the German capitalist class—actively seized the opportunity to gain power and implement their agenda. This occurred not because capitalism faced an existential threat, but rather due to the failure of the Communists and the working class—despite having some electoral advantages—to mount either a revolutionary challenge or a defensive response to the fascist takeover. Moreover, the bourgeoisie did not support the Nazis’ rise as a preemptive strike against a “weakened revolutionary threat” out of fear of its later resurgence. Trotsky himself acknowledged this in September 1932, four months before Hitler’s rise to power, writing that “the Bourgeoise does not see [itself] as being threatened by the proletariat…[The Communist Party] is a long way from a revolutionary achievement…the revolutionary party is weak.”7Leon Trotsky, The Only Road (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1933), available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/1932/320914.htm. Trotsky described the prefascist regimes in Germany as Bonapartist in the sense that, due to the inability of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat to assert clear dominance, a relative equilibrium was maintained between the two forces. He believed this unstable transitional stage would eventually lead to civil war, because “neither is able to win by parliamentary means. Moreover, neither would voluntarily submit to a decision unfavorable to it.”8Leon Trotsky, “Leon Trotsky: The German Enigma,” International Institute for Research and Education, April 8, 2022 [1932], https://www.iire.org/node/1003. However, with the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor, the Communists, Socialists, and the German proletariat largely capitulated to the Nazis, though some heroic resistance did occur. Contrary to Trotsky’s prediction, the Nazis came to power, not through civil war, but via parliamentary means.
Thus, despite the historical fact that fascism’s victory in Germany occurred while the entire left posed no significant threat to capitalism, some on the left continue to perpetuate the myth that fascism is merely a capitalist class response to a revolutionary threat. After the Nazis lost thirty-four seats in the November 1932 election, Rudolf Hilferding, a prominent theorist and editor of the Social Democrats’ journal, assumed National Socialism was defeated. Thus, in a journal article published a few days before Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, he asserted that the primary aim of socialists was to fight against Communism. Franz Neumann argues that the Social Democratic Party was merely socialist in name—a party he describes as lacking ideology, composed of members from most social strata, financed by industry, and careful never to estrange the influential money groups.9Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933–1944 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2009), https://doi.org/10.5040/9798216409052. Such a party could hardly pose an existential threat to capitalism.
As for the Communist International and the leadership of the Communist Party, they had already labeled Social Democrats as “Social Fascists.” Their consistently disastrous policies failed to foster unity between Communists and Socialists, nor did they succeed in attracting members of the Socialist camp to their cause. Their political zigzags, marked by shifting alliances, inconsistent strategies, and a neglect of the Nazi threat, ultimately contributed to their decline and paved the way for Hitler’s rise to power. In conclusion, the bourgeoisie was not fearful of a Communist or working class takeover.
Second, to return to the second objection unresolved by Gordon and Webber’s reply to Poulantzas, even if Trotsky’s claim that the rise of German fascism stemmed from the bourgeoisie’s reaction to the so called “crisis of equilibrium” was correct, it does not mean that the German context constitutes a universal premise for fascist takeovers in post interwar capitalism. Today, no country faces an immediate threat of working class revolution, and there is little indication that such a threat will emerge in the near future. From the authors’ perspective, therefore, any argument that labels the Trump administration as fascist must be flawed, as it fails to meet the necessary condition for such a characterization. In light of this, a concrete analysis of whether Trumpism or similar movements are fascist becomes redundant, which explains why the authors’ evaluation fatalistically leads to an inevitable and predetermined conclusion. Yet, the rise of fascism in any era is not constrained by the same economic and historical context of earlier movements, nor should its analysis be bound to those earlier analytical frameworks. As we will see, twenty-first century neofascism and Trumpism emerge from distinct dynamics shaped by contemporary capitalism’s contradictions and crises, demanding analysis on their own terms.
Gordon and Webber’s uncritical acceptance of Trotsky’s claim that fascism is a response to credible leftist threat also leads them to underemphasize the relative strength and importance of paramilitary rightwing violence within Trumpism. That is, the absence of widespread violence from far right groups or militias is another of their key arguments against recognizing Trumpism as fascist. In their fifth element of fascism, they write: “A necessary condition for fascism, then, is the radicalization of this social layer [petty bourgeoise], which tends to happen when its conditions of existence are under threat and “normal” politics are incapable of providing a solution. ‘At the moment this movement begins physical attacks on the workers, their organizations, and their actions,’ Mandel suggests, ‘a fascist movement is born.’”10Gordon and Webber, “The Authoritarian Disposition.” It follows that, absent such violent radicalization, there is no ground for asserting the emergence of fascism, much less for labeling Trumpism as fascist.
In “Water on the Brain,” Gordon and Webber respond to DK Renton’s claims regarding the significance of Trump’s connection to the militia movement in “Trump, Fascism, and the Authoritarian Turn.”11DK Renton, “Trump, Fascism, and the Authoritarian Turn,” Spectre, April 1, 2025, http://doi.org/10.63478/XIWSTTUP. Here, however, Gordon and Webber shift their criteria. Rather than the violent radicalization of the petty bourgeoisie being the threshold, violent radicalization on the scale of interwar Germany now becomes the criterion for fascist takeover. Gordon and Webber write:
Still, the militia phenomenon in the United States can easily be exaggerated. Given that mass-based paramilitary organization—essential to the rise and victory of fascism in Italy and Germany—is a key feature distinguishing fascism from the rest of right-wing nationalist politics, such exaggerations can distort Trumpism’s proximity to historical fascism. In a recent piece for Spectre, DK Renton argues that Trump enjoys “a militia that supports him,”—comparing it explicitly to Hitler’s and Mussolini’s paramilitary formations. Trump’s “building, emboldening, and adapting to a street movement,” according to Renton, is “the way in which Trump comes closest to the politics” of insurgent interwar European fascism. This is far-fetched.12Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain.”
The authors delve into the weaknesses of far right militias in the United States compared to those in Germany, further supporting their rejection of the prospect of fascism in America. They argue that, given Germany’s population of 66 million in 1931, and a comparable force to the SA’s ( the paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party) 450,000 members in the contemporary United States would be 2.3 million members. Despite the importance other theorists have accorded to the US militias, a mid 2020 report suggests their actual membership was at most 20,000. Consequently, for Gordon and Webber, Renton’s warnings of the fascist implications of Trump’s relation to the militia movement are exaggerations.
In emphasizing the significant presence of paramilitary militias in Nazi Germany to downplay the threat posed in America, Gordon and Webber ignore that the left in Germany also maintained a formidable armed presence. Consequently, while they compare the US militia movement’s strength to historical Germany, they do so in terms of absolute populations of both countries, rather than on the relative balance of forces between leftwing and rightwing militias. The paramilitary wing of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), known as the Roter Frontkämpferbund (Red Front Fighters’ League), reached a peak membership of 130,000 before its ban in 1929, yet it continued to engage in violent confrontations with the Nazi SA. Additionally, other leftist paramilitary groups such as the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold, formed by members of the SPD—boasted thousands of members.
Thus, at least in comparison to today’s United States, the power between left and right militias in Germany was relatively balanced. However, given the weakness of the left’s streetfighting forces in the United States, the comparatively limited number of right wing paramilitary groups in the United States do not pose an obstacle to fascist ascension. There are not even hundreds of armed antifascists in the United States today to pose a threat to the 20,000 members of US militias. The number of paramilitary units necessary to suppress the armed left falls far short of the two million Gordon and Webber suggest. Moreover, a regime that has already placed its most loyal supporters in the highest positions of the state’s repressive apparatus would not need to rely on militias to maintain order. Its control is already deeply institutionalized.
In “The Authoritarian Disposition” (written a year before the last presidential election), Gordon and Webber focused on the records of Trump’s first administration. In their analysis of Trumpism, they found little from that period deserving of the label “fascist,” and expressed surprise that some leftist commentators believed otherwise. A key distinction they highlight, based on their classical model, is the role of paramilitary militias and their use of violence against leftist groups in fascist regimes. However, they overlook the violence committed by white supremacist paramilitaries during that period, which—crucially—took place in collaboration with law enforcement and received support from Trump.
…a regime that has already placed its most loyal supporters in the highest positions of the state’s repressive apparatus would not need to rely on militias to maintain order. Its control is already deeply institutionalized.
As a reminder, hundreds of white nationalists carrying burning torches marched through the University of Virginia campus in Charlottesville, Va., on two days in August 2017, chanting the Nazi slogan: “blood and soil.”13David Neiwert, “When white nationalists chant their weird slogans, what do they mean?” SPLC, October 10, 2017, https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/when-white-nationalists-chant-their-weird-slogans-what-do-they-mean/. This led to the death of counter protester Heather Heyer. We know there were “very fine people on both sides.”14Jordyn Phelps, “Trump defends 2017 ‘very fine people’ comments, calls Robert E. Lee ‘a great general,” ABC News, April 26, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-defends-2017-fine-people-comments-calls-robert/story?id=62653478. When Kyle Rittenhouse shot dead two antifascist protestors and wounded a third in Kenosha, the chief of police defended the vigilantes and blamed the protesters who were shot. Rittenhouse was acquitted of all charges of homicide and other related crimes. He became a hero of the far-right, and Trump called him ‘really a nice young man,’ after which the two were photographed together.15“Trump Says Kyle Rittenhouse Is a ‘Nice Young Man,’ After Meeting,” YouTube video, 0:40, posted by “NBC News,” November 24, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPA40lJ5Xwo. When a far right activist was killed in Portland, a federal task force avenged his death by carrying out the extrajudicial killing of the accused, Michael Reinoehl. Trump gloated about the killing, saying, “We sent in the US Marshals… They knew who he was; they didn’t want to arrest him, and in 15 minutes that ended.”16Jason Hanna and Josh Campbell, “Trump gloats about the US Marshals’ killing of Portland ‘antifa’ suspect,” CNN, October 15, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/15/politics/trump-fugitive-shooting. This was corroborated by five witnesses. “Alexander Reid Ross documented fourteen instances of collaboration between police and white vigilantes. In one case, police stood by as vigilantes armed with bats and hammers beat up those they assumed to be Black Lives Matter protesters.17Richard Seymour, Disaster Nationalism: The Downfall of Liberal Civilization (New York: Verso, 2024), 211.
In response to the 2020 George Floyd protests, Trump told General Milley and his Defense Secretary, Mark Esper, to “beat the fuck out” of protesters and to “crack skulls.”18Martin Pengetty, “Trump told top US general to ‘just shoot’ racism protestors, book claims,” Guardian, June 25, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jun/25/donald-trump-general-mark-milley-crack-skulls#:~:text=President%20also%20said%20law%20enforcement,deal%20repeatedly%20with%20presidential%20rage. When they refused, he asked, “Can’t you just shoot them, just shoot them in the legs or something?” Will his current Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth (whom some label a white supremacist) and the new Army Chief of Staff, General Caine (who Trump praised for saying he “loved” Trump and would “kill for you” while wearing a MAGA hat) refuse the order next time?19Haley Britzky and Natasha Bertrand, “Trump’s pick to be America’s top general denies ever wearing a MAGA hat,” CNN, April 1, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/01/politics/dan-caine-chairman-joint-chiefs-confirmation-hearing.
Yet, none of this seems to matter. Gordon and Webber are correct to claim that, relative to the population of each country, the number of paramilitary militias pale in comparison to interwar Germany. What they ignore is the President’s personal involvement in the coordinated repression carried out by state and paramilitary forces to suppress a movement and the near total absence of an armed left wing threat in the United States.
On January 6, 2021, the white supremacist paramilitaries responded to the orders of the defeated president, attempting to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election in collaboration with some Republican representatives. After Trump’s return to the White House following the 2020 election, he granted pardons to all those convicted, including known neofascists charged with assaulting officers using deadly weapons.
What Gordon and Webber also ignore is that the presence and violence of fascist militias are mainly needed before the rise of fascism, when state military forces are not yet fully under the control of a fascist regime. In Trump’s case, they were in the streets during periods of widespread opposition to the Trump administration, such as during the Black Lives Matter protests and after his election loss. Had Trump been killed in the assassination attempt, widespread bloodshed in the streets and targeted assassinations of opposition figures could have followed, given the mobilized state of far right militias. Like on January 6, the militia could have been called to action again had Trump lost to Biden. However, these groups now feel no need to maintain a visible presence, as they recognize that the Trump White House “has effectively adopted their agenda.” As Enrique Tarrio, the chairman of the Proud Boys, explains: “Things we were doing and talking about in 2017 that were taboo, they’re no longer taboo — they’re mainstream now…Honestly, what do we have to complain about these days?”20Alan Feuer, “In Trump’s Second Term, Far Right Agenda Enters the Mainstream,” New York Times, April 23, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/23/us/politics/trump-far-right.html.
If the first four years of the Trump administration were insufficient to assess the nature of his regime, the storming of the Capitol—regardless of its outcome—marked a pivotal moment for many in recognizing Trump and Trumpism as fascist. This event demonstrated that Trump did not confine his authoritarian ambitions to merely utilizing “the existing legal apparatus to further its authoritarian ends.”
Viewing the Capitol Hill riot as a neofascist alliance between Trump and militia groups seeking to overturn the presidential election results would weaken Gordon and Webber’s argument that fascism is a reaction by the capitalist class to a perceived “revolutionary threat.”In contrast, following the riot, some Marxists and historicans of fascism labeled Trump movement and regime as fascist. As Mike Davis wrote, “[t]he Trump movement has indeed become a genuinely neofascist force organized around the myth of the ‘stolen election’ and tacitly condoning political violence.”21Ben Hillier, “‘We’re witnessing a fundamental political realignment,’: Mike Davis on the crisis in the United States,” Red Flag, January 15, 2021, https://redflag.org.au/article/node-7514/. Or, to quote Robert Paxton, ‘The label [fascism] now seems not just acceptable but necessary.”22Elisabeth Zerofsky, “Is it Fascism? A Leading Historian Changes his Mind,” New York Times, October 23, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/magazine/robert-paxton-facism.html. Unfortunately, Gordon and Webber’s commitment to Trostky’s analysis leads them to ignore these developments, writing in 2023 that Trump’s adventures on January 6 were merely “pushing the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ politics.”23Gordon and Webber, “The Authoritarian Disposition.”
“Not yet fascist”: Fascism or Competitive Authoritarianism
In their second article—apparently written four months into Trump’s second term, but posted two months later on the Spectre website—Gordon and Webber could no longer ignore his brief yet tumultuous record. They highlight some of his bombastic declarations and caution about their implications: “an overwhelming cognitive temptation is to lose oneself in the muddy water, to renege on the pursuit of dry land.” Gordon and Webber offer to take us to “[dryland] where we might find a logic, a strategy, or a discernible and traceable causation behind the frenetic noise of surface appearances.”24Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain.”
In this context, they provide a brief yet unsettling overview of Trump’s 2.0 agenda and actions, which range from his comprehensive Project 2025 to stochastic violence against immigrants and politicians by Trump supporters:
Judicial opposition thus far has been mainly restricted to the lower courts; far right activists have taken thousands of local Republican positions in the last several years, giving them significant influence in the party throughout the country. Many Republican politicians have close ties to paramilitary groups and have participated in protofascist political actions with them, including intimidation at voting centers, threatening violence against the courts and political opponents, and aestheticizing violence in their political propaganda; Trump’s tone and demeanor during his 2024 campaign suffused at times with rhetoric reminiscent of interwar fascists; the MAGA movement, and the far right more generally, retains its core constituency from a radicalized layer of the petty bourgeoisie—the key social base of fascist movements historically.25Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain.”
However, despite this depiction of Trump, Gordon and Webber reject the fascist label, arguing that Trumpism is better understood as a form of competitive authoritarianism. They describe the Trump regime as a form of “competitive authoritarianism” rather than fascism because what lies ahead is not fascist or single party dictatorship. Rather, they view it as a continuation of “liberal democracy,” operating within the same electoral and democratic framework, albeit one in which “incumbents rig the game by deploying the machinery of government to attack opponents and coopt critics.”26Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain.”
Yet, closer inspection of the logic of Gordon and Webber’s analysis reveals that this distinction is still premised on the overextension of Trotsky’s analysis of the rise of fascism in interwar Germany into a model for analyzing the contemporary United States. To illustrate this, note that Gordon and Webber repeatedly indicate that Trump and the Republican Party have not yet crossed the line into fascism. They note:
- The Republican Party has not yet become a fascist organization.
- The Republican Party has not yet committed itself to the full replacement of liberal democracy.
- Trumpian state managers have not yet launched a revolutionary attack on the constitutional order
- The second Trump [administration’s] sustained pursuit of unitary executive theory has not yet amounted to a project of counterrevolutionary futurity linked to violent control of the streets.27Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain,” emphases added.
These statements hide an implicit teleology based on Gordon and Webber’s understanding of the German model. To put the question bluntly: at what point would “fascism” become the appropriate label? To lay bare the teleology housed in Gordon and Webber’s view of the transition to fascism—and their prediction of a mere pushing of the boundaries of “acceptable politics”—Gordon and Webber outline a hypothetical situation in which Trump defies Supreme Court rulings against [!] “the most far reaching elements of his agenda,” prompting a constitutional crisis: “If the police and military failed to align with him against the constitutional order, Trump would need to turn to the available far right paramilitaries. But their current capacities are not remotely comparable to their interwar European counterparts. And without paramilitaries, fascist counterrevolution in Italy and Germany would have been stillborn.28Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain.”
To raise some counterfactual examples that take Gordon and Webber’s taxonomical distinction between “fascism” and “competitive authoritarianism” seriously: if the Supreme Court approves “the most far reaching elements of [Trump’s] agenda”, or if it does not but the police and military choose to follow his orders regardless of the Court’s decisions, would we still remain within the bounds of “competitive authoritarianism?” Webber and Gordon’s centering of the criteria of paramilitary violence on the scale of interwar Germany and their response to the hypothetical constitutional crisis quoted above indicate that it is only when the police and military refuse to comply (an unlikely scenario) that Trump may resort to far-right paramilitaries, signaling a potential shift toward fascism.
This points to a fundamental disagreement I have with Gordon and Webber’s methodology. Gordon and Webber could not have made it clearer that, for them, fascism is defined not by its agenda to dismantle “bourgeois democracy” and impose its racist and white supremacist ideology—common in many of its models—but rather by the tactics and means used to implement them.
[Gordon and Wevbber's] approach also neglects to engage with distinctly “American” elements within the context of Trump's United States. It fails to address the revitalization of the country’s intricate history of oppression, racial violence, the lasting impact of the Civil War, and the pervasive ideology of white supremacy. As a result, their concrete analysis of Trumpism is very much restrained by their elevation of the Trostkyist analysis as a universal model defining fascism.
By contrast, I hold that Trumpism should be understood as a political and ideological movement within the context of US capitalism, rather than simply deduced from the economic system, the interests of the ruling class, or out-of-context references to fascist militias and their violence. Rather than taking us to dryland, Gordon and Webber take us into muddier water, insofar as they present a distorted universalist theory of fascism, primarily centered on the rise and consolidation of power by the Nazis in the interwar period. However, when it comes to their concrete analysis of fascism in the United States, this amounts to little more than a checklist of what is lacking in their abstract model. This checklist includes: “the absence of an existential threat to property, accumulation, and capitalist hegemony,” an insufficient presence of far-right militias, and a lack of physical attacks and other forms of violence. Consequently, they underemphasize the pervasive violence—both legal and extralegal—used to implement Trumpism’s agenda and consequently misrepresent the phenomena. In the previous section I’ve outlined Trump’s approval and quasiofficial encouragement of the extralegal paramilitary forces supporting him. Do these actions imply that the current administration behaves as a “competitive authoritarian” regime, whose operation is confined to “[rigging] the game by deploying the machinery of government to attack opponents and co-opt critics”?
The distinction between the two, in our case, largely hinges on optics. If Trump were to implement an agenda characterized by widespread violence through paramilitary militias, it might then be recognized as fascist. However, if such actions are sanctioned by the Supreme Court or executed by police and military forces, they would likely remain within the boundaries of “acceptable politics,” or be pushing the boundaries without a clear endpoint.
They intended to guide us to dryland, where we could uncover “a logic, a strategy, or a discernible and traceable causation” to understand Trump and Trumpism. Instead, they dropped us into muddier water by basing their account on a Trotskyist teleology that overemphasizes the distinct role of paramilitaries and takes a clean distinction between legal and extralegal violence for granted. This model of fascist takeover both ignores the parliamentary nature of the “fascist” Nazi takeover and the official support for Trumpism’s “competitive authoritarianism.” Gordon and Webber’s fixation on the number of paramilitaries was misplaced, especially considering the formidable presence of the US armed forces and police. As Nikhil Pal Singh points out, the Trump administration hardly needs organized paramilitaries to do its bidding, given the normative, historical, and industrial ways in which the United States operates to master and control indigenous and exogenous Others.29Nikhil Pal Singh, Race and America’s Long War (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), 172–73, quoted in Alberto Toscano, Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism, and the Politics of Crisis (New York: Verso, 2023), 39.
At one point, the authors echo this observation, inadvertently acknowledging that their distinction between paramilitary forces and the US military—and the inadequacy of the former in advancing Trump’s agenda—is somewhat irrelevant. They note: “Trump’s recent use of the National Guard and deployment of Marines to Los Angeles in the context of protests against widescale immigration raids suggests that, thus far, he has not found it necessary to use whatever influence he does enjoy over these disparate US militias.”30Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain.”
Furthermore, their approach also neglects to engage with distinctly “American” elements within the context of Trump’s United States. It fails to address the revitalization of the country’s intricate history of oppression, racial violence, the lasting impact of the Civil War, and the pervasive ideology of white supremacy. As a result, their concrete analysis of Trumpism is very much restrained by their elevation of the Trostkyist analysis as a universal model defining fascism.
If this distinction is what separates fascism from “competitive authoritarianism,” then it would also be inaccurate to characterize the eventual rise of Mussolini and Hitler as a fascist takeover of the state, particularly in Hitler’s case prior to the Reichstag Fire. As Robert O. Paxton observes: “Both Mussolini and Hitler were invited to take office as head of government by a head of state in the legitimate exercise of his official functions, on the advice of civilian and military counselors. Both thus became heads of government in what appeared, at least on the surface, to be legitimate… Indeed, no insurrectionary coup against an established state has ever so far brought fascists to power.”31Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Penguin, 2005), 100. As argued below, while the “legitimate exercise” of power might describe the German state as “competitive authoritarian,” it does not capture the nature of the regime that came to power, the Nazis themselves.
To render the point bare, consider the implications of Gordon and Webber’s taxonomical distinction between fascism and competitive authoritarianism and their analysis of transition point between the two forms of right-wing politics: When a fascist party ascends to power through parliamentary means in the United States or another Western country, presumably, the resulting regime would represent a form of competitive authoritarianism rather than complete fascism because the persistence of elections and certain political rights fundamentally constrains the totalitarian impulses inherent to fascist ideology. However, this very scenario echoes Germany’s experience after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, when the Nazis employed manipulated elections and referendums to validate their rule. In the March 5, 1933 election, all political parties remained on the ballot and the Communists won eighty-one seats, even though many of their representatives were imprisoned or in hiding due to scapegoating following the Reichstag fire. From the perspective of competitive authoritarianism, it is plausible to categorize the German state within this framework—at least until that election.
However, in such a scenario, when a fascist party gains power, its agenda, base, and ideology will dictate that the new regime retains its fascist identity; it should be seen as a fascist regime. While working to align the state with its ultimate goals, the state may still exhibit characteristics of a bourgeois democracy or a form of authoritarianism during its transition. Making the distinction between a fascist regime in power and an authoritarian state that has not yet fully transformed into a fascist state may provide clarity regarding the current juncture. However, the distinction between the nature of the regime (government) in power and that of the state is not usually lost when, for example, a socialist party with a recognizable socialist agenda comes to power. Even when the governing socialist party, for various reasons, fails to make a significant breakthrough in the transition toward socialism, it is not typically labeled merely as another capitalist government or regime. As long as it remains committed to its original agenda despite the obstacles, it retains its identity as a “socialist government.”
Given the distinction between a regime and a state, those who label Trumpism as fascist are specifically referring to the Trump regime rather than suggesting that the United States has already become a fascist state. When Gordon and Webber dismiss this description on the grounds that Trumpism has not yet embodied fascism, they seem to not recognize the distinction between the two. If they do, they believe that none of the actions taken by the Trump regime so far give it a fascist identity. Since fascism in the United States must resemble that of the Nazis—complete with comparable militia presence, violence, and other hallmarks—apparently nothing short of what followed the Reichstag fire qualifies as a fascist assault.
Gordon and Webber are not the only ones who describe the Trump regime as “competitive authoritarianism” based on the description of the term they attribute to two “liberal scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way.”32Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain.” See also, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Path to American Authoritarianism,” Foreign Affairs 104, no. 2 (2025): 38, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/path-american-authoritarianism-trump. Referencing the same Foreign Affairs article, a Tempest Collective editorial , while asserting that “Trump is carrying out an authoritarian nationalist transformation of the U.S. state,” maintains that he is doing it “in favor of what political scientists call ‘“competitive authoritarianism.’”33Tempest National Committee, “Which Way Forward for the Resistance?: Now is the Time for Independent Politics and Solidarity Without Exception,” Tempest, June 29, 2025, https://tempestmag.org/2025/06/which-way-forward-for-the-resistance/.
In a recent article, Levitsky, Way and a third author Daniel Ziblatt, updating the earlier assessment, present a more troubling account of Trump’s authoritarian rule in America. They note that the Trump administration has attempted to politicize the armed forces, urged military leaders to prepare for internal deployments against perceived domestic threats, and has echoed rhetoric used by military dictatorships in South America during the 1970s. They assert that the expansion of ICE has transformed “the agency into a poorly regulated paramilitary force.”34Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Price of American Authoritarianism: What Can Reverse Democratic Decline?” Foreign Affairs, December 11, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/american-authoritarianism-levitsky-way-ziblatt. This transformation renders the argument that a scarcity of paramilitary forces poses a barrier to a fascist trajectory untenable.
The authors also point out that “one form of authoritarian behavior that we did not anticipate a year ago was the Trump administration’s routine subversion of the law—and even the US. Constitution.” However, they fail to acknowledge that under their initial definition of “competitive authoritarianism,” Trump’s actions were not supposed to exceed “exploit[ing] constitutional and legal ambiguities.”
In Foreign Affairs’ “Competitive Authoritarianism,” the authors give a list of other authoritarian regimes, ranging from Alberto Fujimori’s Peru and Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela to current regimes in El Salvador and India. Here too, it is evident that when they group, for example, Chávez’s Venezuela and Trump’s America—with fundamentally different agendas, ideologies, and bases—under the same label of competitive authoritarianism, the term describes, at best, not so much those regimes but the states under them. Rather than clarifying the political stakes, grouping regimes as distinct as Chavez’s Venezuela and Trump’s America together under the same taxonomy adds to the confusion.
This problem is exacerbated due to Gordon and Webber’s eagerness to draw specific political conclusions from the analytic distinction they make. They argue that “the nature of the threat is distinct from fascist dictatorship and begs an appropriately tailored riposte from the left.”35Gordon and Webber, “Water on the Brain.” The Tempest Collective, on the other hand, apparently disagrees. In the same article, it identifies the united front—historically formulated to combat fascism—as the correct strategy to confront Trump’s competitive authoritarianism. I view this disagreement as indicative of the fact that “competitive authoritarianism” is an inadequate concept for analyzing these two opposing regimes. Despite this, the neofascist character of the Trump regime appears to have compelled the Tempest Collective to propose a sound strategy against it despite the limitations of their Trotskyist framework preventing them from naming the threat.
Despite Gordon and Webber’s claims, the Trump regime’s criminalization of antifascism and pardon of neofascist January 6 rioters seem consistent with a fascist political project.
The Foreign Affairs authors write, “the fact that the United States has crossed the line into competitive authoritarianism does not mean that its democratic decline has reached a point of no return.” Here, the phrase “point of no return” implies a fully transformed state. But what should this state be called? If those political scientists believe it is heading toward fascism, they hesitate to name it. This reluctance stems from the near total absence of the terms “fascism” and “fascist” in mainstream US media, even when discussing US paramilitary groups and individuals associated with fascist ideologies.36See for example, the Washington Post‘s use of extremist to describe the groups participating in the. January 6 Capitol riots. Philip Bump, “Timeline: How two extremist groups planned for Jan. 6,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/15/timeline-how-two-extremist-groups-planned-jan-6/.As I’ve shown, the use of “competitive authoritarianism” is deeply flawed because it ignores the dynamics of the global neofascist movement that both inform Trumpism and render it distinct from the interwar German model that Gordon and Webber universalize.
The Neofascist Response
Gordon and Webber introduce the concept of “competitive authoritarianism” only in their second article, drawing on the analysis of the two aforementioned “liberal scholars.” In their shared framework, the Trump regime is rooted in a “sustained pursuit of unitary executive theory,” which they say dates back to Ronald Reagan’s presidency. Notably absent from their analysis is any mention of “ideology,” “white supremacy,” or the role of racism in both driving and resisting Trump’s agenda and its MAGA base. Today’s United States is unrecognizable in their analysis, and their references to capitalism lack any specificity. As such, they seem to hardly consider the possibility of a fascist turn in the United States. Why bother when, in their view, the two main elements of historical fascism do not exist today. As they indicate, fascism in America is, after all, doomed to be stillborn.
Neofascism in the twenty-first century emerges as a response to the systemic crises of capitalism, particularly the deepening economic inequality, ecological collapse, and social disintegration that affect both the Global North and South. Rooted in the logic of capitalist exploitation, neofascist movements exploit public anxiety over economic decline, mass displacement, and environmental degradation—crises that are themselves products of an extractive global system. Central to these movements is palingenetic nationalism, the belief in national rebirth through the purging of perceived degeneracy and the restoration of a mythologized past. In the United States, this ideology is deeply intertwined with a long history of anti-Black racism, including slavery, Jim Crow segregation, mass incarceration, and systemic disenfranchisement. These movements channel fears into narratives of white victimhood, blaming Black and Brown communities, immigrants, and marginalized groups for societal breakdown, while promoting white supremacy, a vision of a racially exclusive ethnostate, and an authoritarian order predicated on national regeneration. By scapegoating people of color and reinforcing racial hierarchies, neofascism serves the interests of capital by maintaining a divided labor force and justifying the removal of surplus populations deemed obstacles to the nation’s rebirth.
The Global North-South divide reveals capitalism’s brutal logic: the South has been systematically reduced to a site of superexploited labor, relentless extraction of fossil fuels and minerals, and a repository for ecological devastation. This extractive model has generated cascading crises—hunger, poverty, armed conflict, and environmental collapse—that have already displaced millions and threaten the survival of over a billion people in the coming decades.
The Global North offers no sanctuary for its population either. Workers there face growing precarity, struggling to secure food, shelter, healthcare, and stable employment. The only time capitalism is colorblind is when it comes to the exploitation of the working class; capitalism’s failures are not confined to the periphery. Crises originating in the Global South—ecological breakdown, mass displacement, and resource depletion—inevitably spill northward, dismantling the illusion that prosperity in one hemisphere can be built on the suffering of another. The contradictions of the system are now visible everywhere
The systemic breakdown of capitalism, particularly the deepening economic inequality and the erosion of social safety nets, has created conditions that fuel the rise of neofascist movements in the United States and Europe. If interwar fascism responded to severe economic crises by constructing nations centered on the idea of a “master race,” then twenty-first-century neofascism follows a parallel trajectory, reimagining nation states as racially and culturally exclusive entities. The growing divide between the Global South and the Global North further fuels these movements, as their consequences increasingly impact the Global North. As living conditions deteriorate and the failures of capitalism become apparent, neofascist movements exploit growing fears of economic decline, ecological collapse, and mass displacement. They channel public anxiety into a narrative of white victimhood, blaming external forces such as migration and globalization to disguise systemic exploitation. By promoting white supremacy and a vision of a white Christian ethnostate, these movements promise security through the restoration of “traditional values” and the dismantling of liberal democracy. Their solution is the creation of a closed, racially exclusive society, fortified by borders and a return to authoritarian order. In this way, capitalism in crisis once again turns to fascism as a means of preserving privilege through exclusion and fear.37Ugo Palheta, Why Fascism is on the Rise in France: From Macron to LePen (New York: Verso, 2025); Seymour, Disaster Nationalism.
Capitalism relies on a divide and conquer strategy. Neofascist ideology—marked by xenophobia, racism, and scapegoating—is used to keep nonwhite and immigrant workers trapped in the conditions of the Global South. The ultimate goal of a segment of the capitalist class that supports this project is an unrestrained dominance of capital, a subservient working class, and the systematic removal of surplus Black and Brown immigrants. This is achieved through a brutal regime of forced deportation for undocumented individuals and “remigration” for others.
Fascist ideologies and organizations have long existed within capitalist systems, but they tend to resurge during periods of deep socioeconomic crises. Their rise is not the result of a deliberate conspiracy by the capitalist class. As seen in the interwar period, fascism rose to power even when capitalist rule was not under existential threat. Today, with the failure of “liberal democracy” and neoliberalism to address widespread inequality and insecurity, and with no viable socialist alternative on the horizon, neofascism claims to be the only solution. Effectively resisting and ultimately defeating it requires building a strong and organized socialist alternative.
The goal of most authoritarian regimes is simply to maintain power. Fascist regimes, however, seek something more ambitious. Fascism seeks radical transformation through palingenetic nationalism, embodying the myth of national rebirth or regeneration. When the Trump regime is viewed merely as authoritarian, this crucial distinction is lost.
In line with the historical model of fascist power grabs, the Trump administration has pursued an authoritarian agenda from its first day in office, systematically seeking to consolidate control over state institutions, civil society, cultural domains, education, and the media. This effort, articulated in Project 2025, is driven by a sustained campaign to dismantle the remnants of “bourgeois democracy,” while exploiting the United States’ legal structures—rooted in slavery, racial capitalism, and systemic oppression—to advance an authoritarian vision.
The white supremacist fascist ideology of the Trump regime is the driving force behind its attacks on minority communities, trans people, and the overwhelmingly undocumented immigrants of color, whose immigration status is indicative of the racism deeply embedded in the United States. The recently announced policies will effectively end legal immigration and citizenship for Black and Brown immigrants, and others will be screened for ideological conformity.
Drawing support from its predominantly petty bourgeois fascist base, the administration has deployed various instruments of the repressive state apparatus to assert control over cities run by Democrats.38Maga Miranda, “Defend the LAnd,” Spectre, June 17, 2025, https://doi.org/10.63478/1UZ20PI3; Robin D. G. Kelley and Deborah Chasman, “Renee Good’s Murder and Other Acts of Terror,” Boston Review, January 17, 2026, https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/renee-goods-murder-and-other-acts-of-terror/. Given their history of resisting racism and police violence, these cities pose a serious challenge to Trump’s authority. By targeting such communities, the strategy seeks to intimidate the public and lay the groundwork for suppressing future mass protests. A military “reaction force” is also being formed specifically to “quell civil disturbances.”
Following the killing of Charlie Kirk, which prompted some in the MAGA movement to exploit it as “the American Reichstag fire,” the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-7) was issued.39U.S Executive Office of the President, “Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence,” The White House, September 25, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/countering-domestic-terrorism-and-organized-political-violence/. This memorandum categorizes antifascist and anticapitalist movements as “domestic terrorism.” Furthermore “anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, and anti-Christianity; support for the overthrow of the United States Government; extremism concerning migration, race, and gender; and hostility towards those who hold traditional “American” views on family, religion, and morality” fall under umbrella of “anti-fascism.” Despite Gordon and Webber’s claims, the Trump regime’s criminalization of antifascism and pardon of neofascist January 6 rioters seem consistent with a fascist political project.
The NSRM-7 is already being used to conduct surveillance and suppress protests against ICE’s violent operations, treating demonstrators as if they are “terrorists.” In a country where mass shootings and random acts of violence occur daily, certain selected incidents are leveraged to justify new laws targeting immigrants and curtailing democratic rights. How many “American Reichstag fires” are we from what Gordon and Webber would concede is a point of no return?
Although the permanent militarism and imperialist policies of the United States weaken the argument for linking them directly to the fascist characteristics of Trumpism—particularly given Gordon and Webber’s project of rooting Trumpism within the tradition of authoritarian liberalism—the regime’s ambition to annex other countries fits well with the historical patterns of fascism of the interwar period. Additionally, Trump’s openly stated plan to seize ownership of Gaza and develop it as a real estate project through the ethnic cleansing of the survivors of the genocide exposes his regime’s deep affinity with neocolonialism and fascism.
The Trump regime, exploiting the United States’ enormous economic, military, and political power, has waged a war to bring other countries—especially in the Americas—into line under its domination through various means of regime change and by empowering far right and neofascist parties in those nations. The “regime change” agenda remains part of the US government’s grand strategy, but this time it is no longer disguised as bringing “democracy” and “human rights” to other countries. Trump’s openly declared policy of seizing oil and other valuable resources from other nations, whether through regime change or not, supersedes what has already been viewed as naked imperialism.
The real implication of this distinction [between fascism and “competitive authoritarianism”] is not for the “vanguard of the proletariat” (which does not exist) to adopt the right strategy or lead the struggle. Rather, it’s a test for academics and activists: whether they remain relevant to the struggles of ordinary people, or become detached from the front lines of resistance.
Based on the distinction between a fascist state and a fascist regime, no one claims that today’s United States fully embodies fascism, nor is it certain that it will in the future. However, since no regime can consistently adhere to its agenda and ideology, deviations from its course tend to mask its true nature and identity. The Trump administration, facing widespread opposition, a struggling economy, and internal divisions within the MAGA movement is inevitably compelled to deviate from its course at times. Nevertheless, this should not obscure our understanding of the regime’s overarching neofascist trajectory. Gordon and Webber’s stringent insistence on the conformity of the present moment to their historical model obscures the fascist dynamics of governing the Trump movement. The totality of the Trump regime—its agenda, the petty bourgeoisie MAGA movement, paramilitary militias, white supremacist and ultranationalist ideologies, and racist and xenophobic language and propaganda—can best be described as neofascist to distinguish it from the twentieth-century model of fascism.
Gordon and Webber go to great lengths to persuade us that “evading due process (including the suspension of habeas corpus), politicizing deportations, trampling free speech, repressing dissent, and using concentration camps are very much a part of the liberal tradition.” And if something still gives us pause, from Gordon and Webber’s perspective, we should consider it a shift in the boundaries of what is deemed “acceptable” in politics and not confuse it with fascism.
But this distinction is not merely academic for those on the receiving end of state violence. For Black and Brown communities, immigrants, and others who experience the full force of the state, this violence is real, immediate, and deadly. Many of us, they say, have felt this way long before we, our parents, or our ancestors arrived in the United States, and we still feel we cannot escape its wrath here. Could it be that we are living in a fascist state masked by what they call “liberal tradition”? It is true that many of these atrocities—such as the ongoing genocide in Palestine—have occurred under the banner of “bourgeois democracy.” But the question remains: can a system still be called “democratic” when it openly rejects the values it claims to uphold? The current regime, like its interwar fascist predecessors, has effectively declared: to hell with the pretense of democracy, human rights, and due process. Trump said it himself: “I don’t need international law… the only thing that stops me is my own morality.”40“Trump Says His Only Limit on His Global Powers Is His Own Morality,” YouTube video, 1:14, posted by “New York Times,” January 9, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/shorts/ysZJUjhnt3M. Can Trumpism still be wrapped under the cloth of “liberal democracy?”
Conclusion: The Implications of a Distinction
Does it even matter whether the Trump regime is labeled “neofascist” or “competitive authoritarian”? If this distinction were confined to radical left discourse, given its minimal influence, it carries little weight. Had our writings and statements been consequential, we would have seen vigorous debates across leftist organizations and journals about appropriate strategies and tactics. Instead, these groups typically operate in isolation, focusing on their own perspectives while dismissing alternatives. This lack of engagement persists because it poses no risk to their positions.
Yet as we’ve seen, people forced to fight back against oppression and exploitation often find ways to do so, without waiting for articulation of their struggle by anyone. The real implication of this distinction is not for the “vanguard of the proletariat” (which does not exist) to adopt the right strategy or lead the struggle. Rather, it’s a test for academics and activists: whether they remain relevant to the struggles of ordinary people, or become detached from the front lines of resistance. The distinction matters not because of the label itself, but because how we frame the threat shapes the response. If we falsely label it “competitive authoritarianism,” we risk normalizing state violence as a “shift in boundaries” within liberal democracy. But if it is neofascist, we should recognize it as such and as a break from democracy—rooted in racial capitalism, white supremacy, and the logic of extermination. This matters because the way we frame the problem determines the strategy. A “competitive authoritarian” regime might be seen as reformable; a “neofascist” regime demands resistance, not reform. The distinction is not academic—it’s practical. It determines whether we organize for reform or dismantling fascism and capitalism. And if we fail to name the true nature of the threat, we risk leading people into a dead end. That risk may not be immediate, given the left’s limited reach, but we need clarity in our analysis while striving for tangible impact in ongoing struggles.
Unlike during the first Trump administration, when characterizing Trump’s regime as fascist was frequently dismissed as a radical leftist slogan that might alienate the broader public, this characterization is now gaining considerable traction. It seems that some on the left are lagging behind a growing segment of the population that increasingly views Trumpism as fascist. However, while the label reflects the growing awareness among Trump’s targets of the threat they face, it should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric or sloganeering. Given the flaws in other analyses of Trumpism, understanding it as neofascist offers greater clarity and should guide the strategic response.
In cities where ICE operations are intensified, there is a noticeable rise in radical resistance actions and antideportation sentiments. Community groups form to protect immigrants from enforcement. Protesters draw stark parallels between Trumpism and fascism, equating ICE with the Gestapo, and expressing a strong rejection of both immigration enforcement and the deployment of the National Guard.
The correct strategies and tactics require the involvement of those actively engaged in the struggle, rather than being prescribed by any single individual or organization. That said, given past antifascist movements, it can be argued that we might set aside the concept of a popular front, as we are not yet at the stage of reconstructing nations from the remnants of fascism. Instead, a united front of diverse groups—sections of the working class, immigrants, people of color, LGBTQ+ communities, feminists, and other progressive forces—that are among the most targeted by the Trump regime can form the foundation of an antifascist movement that directly challenges Trump’s regime and its ideology of white supremacy.
This united front strategy must be grounded in a framework oriented around the working class and socialism; it cannot be limited to opposing authoritarianism alone, as shown by many ‘No Kings’ protests. These demonstrations deserve praise for mobilizing millions of protesters across America, yet they primarily emphasize support for the Constitution and democratic institutions, alongside opposition to specific policies of the Trump administration. Many participants display the American flag and patriotic symbols, with only a few carrying explicitly antiauthoritarian or antifascist messages. In several major cities, militant labor unions with antioligarchy and anticapitalist slogans have filled this gap. Since most union leadership has not opposed Trumpism, rank and file members must take the lead in resisting it.
It is worth noting, however, that even the message of the “No Kings” protests, despite its limitations, reflects a more radical political stance than the one implied by “competitive authoritarianism.” The former calls for a transformation, requiring a broad movement and radical antiauthoritarian leadership to dismantle authoritarianism. In contrast, the latter views regime change as achievable through routine electoral competition, where establishment Democratic candidates may be elected on the promise of upholding the Constitution once in office. In a mayoral race largely disconnected from foreign affairs and the presidency, a self-described “democratic socialist” candidate won by rallying the marginalized Black and Brown working class of New York City to improve their living conditions. Zohran Mamdani’s victory—shaped by condemnation of the genocide in Palestine, his denunciation of Trump as a fascist, and his unwavering opposition to ICE raids—demonstrates that the fight against Trump and Trumpism must be a full scale, class-based movement. Despite its limitations (as it was for a local political office), Mamdani’s campaign offers insight into how a united front strategy with a socialist orientation can be launched against the Trump regime.
Without a movement capable of significantly resisting capitalism’s assault on the working class and the systemic repression faced by minority communities, the fascization of the state will likely continue, even if Trumpism narrowly loses power. In that situation, under a new Democratic administration, the conditions for authoritarianism may persist, potentially leading to a full resurgence of Trumpism without Trump. On the other hand, a massive antifascist movement can defeat not just Trump, but also Trumpism and its MAGA base. It can marginalize right wing Democrats and serve as a catalyst for forming powerful grassroots organizations and possibly a genuine socialist organization
Just as territorial expansion and militarism were integral to interwar fascism, the ongoing neofascist transformation cannot be confined to America’s borders. The Trump regime is on a path to imposing its domination across the hemisphere and beyond—mafia style, through brute force. In response, the antifascist, class oriented struggle against Trumpism must also be fiercely anti-imperialist. Building an antifascist, anti-imperialist united front does not necessarily require a lengthy process of coalition building. Instead, it demands the recognition that no organization or group can afford to focus solely on the single issue they identify with most. Rather, this unity is the very condition of the struggle: Anti-imperialists must fight for LGBTQ+ and immigrant rights, and vice versa. This is how a broad, unified movement can emerge. What may appear to be an act of solidarity is, in fact, an essential part of our own struggle.
The Trump administration has accelerated capitalism’s descent into barbarism, intensifying the urgency for resistance. Mass movements do not emerge solely from political organizations or activists. While the broader left currently lacks the organizational structures to make a decisive impact, it can still play a vital role by acknowledging its responsibility to deeply understand and actively engage with this critical moment.