The UAE’s Subimperialism in Sudan
Counterrevolution, Gold, and Global Impunity
August 15, 2025
Sudan today is not only a battlefield between two militarized factions. It is a graveyard of regional and international hypocrisy and a case study in subimperialism—a subimperialist country being one that is not a major imperial power, yet acts in ways that align with the interests of imperial powers and behaves as an imperialist within its own region. The war that has devastated Sudan since April 2023 is not only a Sudanese tragedy; it is a manifestation of a broader global order in which financial interests, military influence, and strategic alignments matter more than people’s lives or democratic aspirations. At the heart of this configuration lies the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The UAE’s role in Sudan is not an anomaly. It is part of a coherent, well-financed, and regionally expansive project: a subimperialist agenda that combines economic extraction, authoritarian alliance-building, and counterrevolutionary politics under the cover of diplomatic sophistication and global partnerships. Sudan, tragically, is one of its central laboratories.
From Arab Spring to December Revolution: A Threat to UAE’s Order
The roots of the UAE’s destructive role in Sudan go back more than a decade. In 2011, the UAE (alongside Saudi Arabia) viewed the Arab Spring as an existential threat to both the authoritarian regimes in the region and its own model of governance: a rentier monarchy reliant on coercion, corruption and the suppression of dissent. Both the falls of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt and the rise of democratic movements in Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain represented the early warnings of a storm that must be contained at all costs for the Emirati leadership.
This was not mere reaction, as the UAE became an active counterrevolutionary force. In Egypt, it bankrolled the military coup that brought Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power and helped rebuild Egypt’s repressive security apparatus. In Libya, it supported Khalifa Haftar’s war against the internationally recognized government effectively dividing the country. And in Sudan, it forged deep ties with Omar Al-Bashir’s regime and, in later years, deepened its alliance with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—the paramilitary successor of the Janjaweed militias which committed atrocities against civilians and rebels on behalf of Bashir’s regime during the 2000s.
The Sudanese people’s December 2018 revolution, culminating in the ousting of Bashir in April 2019, directly challenged the UAE’s regional project. The revolution was democratic, civilian-led, and explicitly antimilitary. For the UAE, this presented a dilemma: how to maintain influence in Sudan without appearing openly hostile to the revolution?
The solution was sophisticated: cooptation, divide-and-rule tactics, and long-term military investment—most notably in the RSF.
The Rise of the RSF: A Proxy for Subimperial Influence
The RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) became the perfect Emirati partner. In April 2019, Hemedti (along with leaders of the armed forces and security services) orchestrated the ousting of Bashir, fearing the regime’s collapse due to the revolution. Burhan and Hemedti assumed the leadership of the Transitional Military Council and later became the military leaders of the transitional government, which was originally mandated to govern the country for thirty-nine months.
The RSF’s relationship with the UAE flourished. In 2015, Bashir’s regime sent RSF fighters alongside the Sudanese Army’s fighters to serve in the Saudi-led war on Yemen under UAE command—a transactional relationship that combined military outsourcing with political legitimacy. In return, Hemedti received weapons, logistical support, and diplomatic cover.
The UAE, as a peripheral nation that engages in imperialist practices within its own region while remaining dependent on the United States (that is, on a core imperialist power), exemplifies the transformation into a subimperialist state that many other regional powers are undergoing. The UAE seeks influence without governance and power without accountability. The fragmentation, weak institutions, and global neglect of African and Middle Eastern countries like Sudan, Libya, and Yemen provide a fertile field for the UAE’s meddling.
Hemedti offered two key assets. These were the capacity for violence—that is, a force willing to suppress protests, fight wars, and eliminate rivals—and economic access, especially to Sudan’s lucrative gold trade, which the RSF increasingly controlled.
Between 2013 and 2023, the RSF deepened its hold on Sudanese gold mining operations, especially in Darfur and other peripheral regions. Much of the gold is smuggled to the UAE, which became the main hub for Sudanese conflict gold—gold that undermined civilian control, funded militias, and strengthened warlords.
October 2021 Coup and Emirati Shielding
When the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) (led by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan) and the RSF (led by Hemedti) staged the coup of October 25, 2021, it marked the formal end of Sudan’s democratic transition. The UAE’s response was not condemnation—it was diplomacy.
Publicly, Abu Dhabi called for “restraint” and “dialogue.” Behind the scenes, it maintained its links with both Burhan and Hemedti, hedging its bets while preserving its leverage. However, the RSF remained the primary Emirati vehicle and their economic ties—particularly through gold—only deepened.
When the current war erupted in April 2023 between the SAF and RSF, it was no surprise that Hemedti’s forces were unusually well-equipped, coordinated, and resilient. Their ability to seize vast parts of Khartoum and other regions in Central and Southern Sudan, loot infrastructure, and establish control in Darfur owed much to external support received over the preceding years and, more crucially, after the war’s outbreak.
UAE’s Subimperialism Across Africa: Ports, Gold, and Proxy Power
Sudan is not the only arena where the UAE has exported its influence through military, economic, and political channels. Over the past fifteen years, the UAE has expanded its economic footprint across Africa through investments in ports, airports, and infrastructure projects. These ventures are not solely driven by business interests but also serve as strategic moves to extend its influence. The UAE has extensive military cooperation agreements and substantial investments in agricultural land, renewable energy, mining, and telecommunications, making it a significant player in regional geopolitics.
The UAE, as a peripheral nation that engages in imperialist practices within its own region while remaining dependent on the United States (that is, on a core imperialist power), exemplifies the transformation into a subimperialist state that many other regional powers are undergoing.
The UAE seeks influence without governance and power without accountability. The fragmentation, weak institutions, and global neglect of African and Middle Eastern countries like Sudan, Libya, and Yemen provide a fertile field for the UAE’s meddling.
In Sudan, this strategy has taken an especially violent turn both because of the stakes involved—gold, geopolitical position, and political influence over one of the largest countries in Africa—and because of Sudan’s revolution, which stood on a tightrope. The RSF, acting as a private army with state-like functions, was the ideal local partner for the UAE.
War in 2023: A Proxy Bloodbath Without Accountability
As the war between the RSF and SAF escalated in 2023, the RSF benefited from pre-positioned supplies, logistics chains, and regional safe havens—all characteristic signs of external backing. Human rights monitors, journalists, and Sudanese activists repeatedly pointed to the UAE’s role in the war. Yet, not a single Emirati official has been sanctioned. No pressure has been exerted on Abu Dhabi to stop the flow of gold or weapons.
Instead, global institutions—including the UN Security Council—remained paralyzed, often citing geopolitical gridlock and lack of clarity. Sudanese civilians have paid the price.
Peace talks and conferences in Jeddah, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Bahrain, Geneva and London dragged on, often excluding key civilian voices while allowing the military factions to rebrand themselves. The RSF has continued to receive political and media legitimacy from global outlets, while their war crimes are downplayed or obscured.
From Revolution to War: A Sudanese Struggle Against Subimperialism
To understand the current war only as a clash between two generals is to ignore the larger struggle that Sudanese people have been waging for decades against military rule, foreign exploitation, and the international system that enables both.
When the Sudanese people rose up in December 2018, they were not calling simply for a change in the faces at the top; they were demanding a wholesale transformation of the state—freedom, peace, social justice, civilian governance, and accountability. The slogan “Freedom, Peace, and Justice” was not rhetorical; it was revolutionary in its scope and was met with bullets, detention, massacres, and betrayal.
Sudanese resistance committees, women’s groups, trade unions, and professional associations continued to organize throughout the transitional period and even after the October 2021 coup. They refused to acquiesce to military authority, rejected normalization deals forced from abroad, and insisted that democracy must come from the people, rather than foreign summits or armed factions. Their vision was articulated through foundational documents, including charters and press releases, as well as through powerful, carefully crafted slogans voiced during peaceful protests and marches.
This grassroots resistance posed a threat to both Sudan’s own elites and regional powers like the UAE, who prefer a submissive Sudan that exports gold and mercenaries rather than ideas or revolutions. The model of Egyptian military rule, propped up by Gulf money and Western tolerance, emerged as a key counterrevolutionary response to the 2010–11 Arab Spring. This Egyptian model was meant to be replicated in Sudan, but Sudanese youth firmly rejected it.
Rather than merely being a conflict between the RSF and SAF, the war is in many ways a counterrevolutionary war against the Sudanese people. Both military factions have attacked civilians, both have obstructed humanitarian aid, both have tried to coopt civil society, and both have been shielded—directly or indirectly—by international actors unwilling to challenge the status quo.
Unmasking the UAE’s Role: Gold, Guns, and Geopolitics
By now, the evidence is overwhelming. Gold is being smuggled from areas controlled by both the RSF and SAF to Dubai, fueling illicit networks and conflict financing. Weapons transfers through Libya, Chad, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Kenya, and other countries show a deliberate and sustained supply chain supporting Hemedti’s forces. The UAE has also facilitated medical evacuations of RSF soldiers to its hospitals. In parallel, Emirati diplomatic, political, and public relations campaigns have worked to legitimize the RSF as a political actor and supported the efforts of a breakaway government.
To stop the war in Sudan and prevent future ones, we must challenge both the local actors and the international enablers behind them.…This is not only about Sudan. It is about the kind of world envisioned and propagated by tyrants—one where authoritarianism is outsourced and imperialism wears a regional face.
This is not passive complicity, but active subimperial intervention. The UAE is not a neutral Gulf state seeking peace. It is a belligerent actor operating through a proxy—the RSF—while preserving plausible deniability.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the International Community: Complicity by Silence
Despite abundant evidence of the UAE’s role in supporting the RSF and undermining Sudan’s democratic transition, the international response has been weak at best and complicit at worst. While the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and many European countries have issued statements calling for ceasefires and civilian protection, none have imposed sanctions on Emirati or external actors linked to war profiteering or gold smuggling.
Why?
The answer lies in realpolitik and selective accountability. The UAE is a strategic partner of the West. It is a buyer of arms, a major collaborator with Israel’s genocidal regime, a conduit for intelligence, and a financial hub. It has hosted US military bases, participated in counterterrorism operations, and invested heavily in Western economies. In short, it is too useful to punish.
In the final months of the Biden administration, some US lawmakers intensified efforts to halt arms sales to the UAE in response to mounting evidence that it—despite previous assurances to the contrary—continued to supply weapons to the RSF. The White House had initially agreed to monitor and verify Emirati compliance, but a January 2025 briefing confirmed the UAE’s ongoing support for the RSF. This prompted the reintroduction of the Stand Up for Sudan Act, which would prohibit US arms exports to the UAE until it fully ceases material support to the RSF, arguing that US leverage must be used to help stop the ongoing war and genocide.
On May 5, the International Court of Justice dismissed Sudan’s case, accusing the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention by arming and funding the RSF. Citing the UAE’s reservation to the treaty’s jurisdiction clause, the ICJ ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and did not assess the merits of Sudan’s claims.
On May 22, the US Department of State accused Sudan’s military (the SAF) of using chemical weapons during its civil war with the RSF and announced new sanctions, including export restrictions and financial measures. However, the US government has provided no public evidence to support this claim and has not followed the proper procedures required by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—a body of which Sudan is a member, sitting on its executive council.
This accusation appears to be the latest example of Trump’s foreign policy becoming explicitly transactional and corrupt during his second term. The announcement followed his visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, where he sought to secure investment deals for the United States and, reportedly, to expand his and his family’s personal business interests in the region. Many analysts have long argued that Sudan’s war has evolved into a proxy conflict, with the UAE backing the RSF and Saudi Arabia supporting the SAF. As growing public scrutiny and international pressure expose the UAE’s role in war crimes and genocide, it seems that the Trump administration is using accusations against the SAF to deflect attention and balance the narrative. Through these attempts, the Trump regime hopes to remain at equal distance from both the UAE/RSF and Saudi Arabia/SAF.
These accusations inevitably draw parallels to past events, notably the Clinton administration’s 1998 missile strike launched during the height of the Lewinsky scandal on Sudan’s Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant. The United States claimed the facility was producing chemical weapons linked to Osama bin Laden, but later investigations found little to no supporting evidence for that claim and many experts concluded the plant was civilian. It also recalls the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was justified by the false premise of weapons of mass destruction. These claims were ultimately proven to be entirely fabricated.
The preceding considerations should not be understood as absolving the SAF of war crimes committed against civilians during this war or throughout its history. Rather, they foreground the Trump administration’s underhanded maneuverings to strengthen relationships with the Gulf by flipping the narrative while still failing to effectively address the war.
The Cost of Silence: Sudanese Civilians Pay the Price
The consequences of this international silence are not merely theoretical; they are brutally real. As many as hundreds of thousands have been killed. Millions more have been displaced, with many forced to live in filthy camps across borders or in besieged cities. The country’s infrastructure—including universities, hospitals, and cultural institutions—has been systematically destroyed in what amounts to a deliberate war on Sudanese society. Widespread sexual violence has also been reported, with the RSF allegedly targeting women and girls as tools of war.
On the other hand, the Sudanese resistance has not disappeared. It has adapted, decentralized, and reconnected with global allies. Sudanese people—both inside and outside the country—are providing much-needed aid, assistance, and health and educational services. They are also organizing, documenting, and demanding justice. What they need is solidarity and not charity; accountability and not sympathy.
What Must Be Done: A Call to Action
To stop the war in Sudan and prevent future ones, we must challenge both the local actors and the international enablers behind them. That includes sanctioning all foreign entities that fund or arm the RSF, including companies and individuals in the UAE. It also requires exposing and disrupting the conflict gold trade, especially its routes through Dubai and its connections to RSF finances. The UAE’s role in weapons transfers must be investigated and international legal mechanisms should be pursued to halt this supply chain. The need to support Sudanese civilian-led initiatives—such as emergency response rooms, resistance committees, humanitarian corridors, and survivor-led documentation efforts, and independent media—is equally important. Finally, we must confront the political logic of the Western–Gulf alliance, which treats the UAE and Saudi Arabia as untouchable partners; strategic relationships must not come at the cost of civilian lives.
This is not only about Sudan. It is about the kind of world envisioned and propagated by tyrants—one where authoritarianism is outsourced and imperialism wears a regional face. If subimperialism succeeds in Sudan, it will spread in Africa, the Middle East, and beyond.
A different future remains possible. The revolutionary movements in Sudan, with their unwavering demand for civilian governance and social justice, present a compelling alternative—one rooted in grassroots legitimacy, democratic principles, and transnational solidarity. Achieving this future will require more than expressions of support for Sudanese civil actors; it demands a critical confrontation with the international political and economic frameworks that have sustained authoritarianism and foreign interference. A meaningful way forward must begin with a clear-eyed understanding of these realities and a firm, consistent commitment to justice—one that resists being compromised by strategic interests or geopolitical alignments.